A Carriocentric Universe 

Richard describes the “Secular Humanist’s Heaven,” the world he is aiming for, as “a world rather like that in Star Trek: The Next Generation.”[i] The problem is that, instead of putting his little ship into orbit around a suitable “Class M” planet, Richard has attempted to put the entire universe into orbit around himself. In other words, instead of going to the evidence and letting it carry him along on a safe and steady course, Richard has opted to force the evidence to conform to his own narrow worldview. We have seen this phenomena repeatedly in the previous sections, and we will see it again in all that remain.  

Before we join Richard and his secular humanist companions on their voyage to colonize the universe, let’s all take a quick trip to Planet Reality. In order to defend Metaphysical Naturalism, Richard must account for several things. If a worldview is claimed to be scientifically and philosophically credible, it must reasonably explain (1) the existence of the universe, (2) the apparent fine-tuning of the universe, (3) the origin of life from non-life, and (4) the rise of consciousness. While Richard attempts to account for these four aspects of our world, his reasoning is no better than it was when he argued that a D-cup bra is evidence of a defunct God. 

In an effort to explain both the existence of the universe and its apparent fine-tuning, Richard appeals to modern theories of the multiverse. The various multiverse theories all maintain that the universe we observe is only one of innumerable—perhaps infinite—universes. This large complex of universes, taken together, is called a “multiverse.” Richard considers this to be the best explanation for the existence of our universe: 

Currently the most credible explanations of the nature and origin of the universe belong to “multiverse theory,” the idea that our universe is just one of many.[ii] 

While there are many multiverse theories, with differing degrees of merit, Richard says that he is most impressed by Lee Smolin’s view. According to Smolin, universes actually give rise to new universes wherever there are black holes: 

[I]f a Big Bang looks exactly like a really big mass crushed to an extreme point, and black holes are really big masses crushed to an extreme point, then it may well be that inside every black hole is a new Big Bang. Every time a star collapses, a new universe explodes, in another direction, outside our universe.[iii] 

Since Smolin’s theory entails that some of the fundamental properties of a universe will be retained—with some modification—by the universes it spawns, this theory allows for the formation of increasingly complex universes through a process of natural selection: 

For Smolin’s one single assumption produces all three ingredients: reproduction—as every universe producing black holes spawns new universes, and many of those spawn countless more, and so on; mutation—as each universe is randomly just a little different than the next; and selection—as only those universes that are rich producers of black holes will multiply. From this single assumption it follows that universes exactly like ours are inevitable.[iv] 

Thus, given Smolin’s theory, our universe is a necessary consequence of this process of cosmological evolution. “But,” one may wonder, “where did the multiverse come from?” Richard argues (1) that the multiverse needs no cause because there is no basis for the generalization that all things must have a cause, and (2) that the multiverse needs no cause because it is eternal: 

[A]lthough it seems that everything must have a cause, therefore the multiverse must have a cause, there is no real basis for such a generalization. The only reason to believe that anything has a cause is that we observe it to be so. But what we are observing is inside a universe, inside time. There is no reason to believe the same expectations should hold outside the universe, outside time.[v] 

We don’t yet know if the multiverse has existed for an infinite length of time, or if it had a beginning. . . . [I]t may be that if we keep going back in time we will keep finding universe after universe, and it may well be it is universes all the way down. . . . Our universe is simply in the middle of a fixed, endless structure. For the same reason a multiverse that had a beginning would not have come “from” anywhere—there would exist nothing “before” the first ever moment of time, and that first moment of time, like every moment of time, would simply be an eternal fixed reality. It needs no cause. It is its own cause.[vi] 

[T]he multiverse is eternal, in the sense that it exists at every point of time that exists, has existed, or ever will exist. And for that reason it did not come “from” anywhere. There was never a time when it did not exist, so it did not come from “nothing,” because there has never been “nothing.” There has always been “something,” from which every universe is born.[vii] 

While it is amazing to think that atheists would be willing to deny the principle of cause and effect in their desperate efforts to defend their views, it is just as startling to find Richard suggesting that the multiverse is eternal when it has supposedly developed through a process of evolution. If the universes get simpler and simpler as we go back in time, wouldn’t we eventually get to a beginning? Richard’s view suggests this, yet he claims that the multiverse would still be eternal, for the beginning would be “an eternal fixed reality.” Frankly, I just can’t make sense of this (and neither can Richard). But it isn’t because I deny the possibility of something uncaused and eternal. On the contrary, this is what theists believe about God. Yet the physical universe is a different matter altogether. Richard’s view entails that our universe came from another universe, which came from another, which came from another. If he says that it goes on forever like this (and he presents this as an option), he must accept the possibility that we have crossed an infinite amount of time, events, and universes to get where we are today. This, of course, runs into all of the problems addressed by the Kalam Cosmological Argument.[viii] The Kalam argument demonstrates that it is impossible to traverse an actual infinite, so the fact that we are here demands a finite number of past events. Richard knows that this is a problem for his theory. In fact, when he is critiquing theism, he rejects the idea of an infinite regress: 

Another problem is what philosophers call “infinite regress.” If everything must have an explanation, then you do not really get anywhere by explaining the universe by proposing a god. For then that god needs an explanation. Why does a god exist at all? Why that particular god and not some other? And where did this god come from?[ix] 

Two things are worthy of note here. First, Richard criticizes the Christian argument for leading to an infinite regress (when it doesn’t, since we believe in a timeless, nonphysical First Cause), which is something that his own theory demands (because he actually believes in an infinite regress of universes). So, we may add this to the above list of inconsistencies. Second, he isn’t really responding to the Christian argument, and he knows it. He presents the Cosmological Argument as if it were this: 

Premise One: Everything that exists must have a cause.

Premise Two: The universe exists.

Conclusion: Therefore, the universe must have a cause. 

He attacks this straw man by pointing out that Premise One would mean that God must also have a cause. But watch what happens when we remove the straw from his straw man: 

Premise One: Everything that begins to exist must have a cause.

Premise Two: The universe began to exist.

Conclusion: Therefore, the universe must have a cause.[x] 

When we see the argument in its true form, we can understand why Richard is forced to question the principle of cause and effect. We also see why he argues that the multiverse is eternal. He must oppose these premises in order to avoid the obvious conclusion—that the universe must have a cause. Yet, as we have seen, he can’t argue that the multiverse is eternal, for that would require both an infinite regress of causes (which he criticizes) and the traversal of an actual infinite (which is absurd). On the other hand, if Richard says that the multiverse did have a beginning (and he seems to grant this, albeit inconsistently), it makes no sense to argue that it needs no cause on the grounds that we have “no basis for such a generalization.” Indeed, we can’t even imagine what it would mean for something to come into existence without a cause. Now, if the multiverse were eternal, this particular problem wouldn’t be so great. But we have no reason to believe that it is eternal, and the idea of an eternal series of temporal, physical universes is fraught with philosophical difficulties. 

Richard also uses multiverse theory to account for the apparent fine-tuning of our universe. Scientists have noted that our universe is governed by numerous laws and constants, which, if changed only slightly, would make our existence impossible. Since it seems improbable that literally dozens of forces and constants would be just right for life in a universe that formed at random, atheists must postulate an explanation for such a miraculous convergence of values. Richard answers with an analogy: 

Everyone knows that rolling a die over and over again will only produce a purely random string of numbers. Yet orderly sequences are always among such random possibilities. For example, if you roll a die enough times, the odds become very good that you will roll the exact orderly sequence of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. . . . It follows that every random chaos will always, as a matter of logical necessity, contain many pools of order. And the larger the chaos, the more times it expands or reproduces, then the more pools of order it will inevitably generate simply by chance—and the more complex they will be, too. Thus, order is the inevitable outcome of random chance. Pure chaos can thus lead inevitably, and quite easily, to that minimal order necessary to get Chaotic Inflation or Smolin Selection started, which in turn lead inevitably to more and more order, and eventually to us.[xi] 

How, then, did we get such an orderly universe? Well, there was a lot of chaos, which over time developed into our orderly universe. Of course, Richard could use this argument to explain away any sort of order:  

Question: Where did the pyramids come from? 

Response: Well, at first there was a lot of chaos . . .” 

In other words, it’s correct to say that chaos can give rise to limited pools of order. But the greater the order, the greater the difficulty of attributing it to chaos. And on Richard’s view, everything is ultimately attributable to chaos: 

[I]f there was a first event in time, from which all universes ultimately sprung and upon which everything has been built, it must have been the simplest possible thing . . . something incredibly basic, an Ultimate Simplex . . . And a fundamental chaos is the simplest possible thing we can think of, having no fixed order that needs explaining. And as we have seen, multiverse theory proves that such a chaos can produce our universe.[xii] 

I must have missed the part where Richard proved that chaos can produce our universe, but that’s beside the point. He argues that the “Ultimate Simplex” must have been the “simplest possible thing.” But what is necessary to get his theory going? To get his process of natural selection started, Richard needs not only a universe, but a self-replicating universe. It is also necessary for this first universe to have some very specific properties.  For example, it can’t produce universes exactly like itself, for this would allow no variation. But neither can it produce universes very different from itself, for Smolin’s theory of cosmological natural selection demands that certain valuable characteristics be retained by the newly-spawned universes. Thus, we need a spectacular universe-producing machine (very similar to a self-replicating living organism) that is capable of giving rise to an infinite number of vastly more complex universes, and we need this machine at the very beginning of the whole process. Contrary to Richard’s speculations, such an immense piece of equipment is far from being the simplest thing we can imagine. Indeed, if such amazing technology existed, it would be evidence for a divine engineer, not for a primal chaos. 

Strangely, Richard appeals to the work of Paul Davies to support his view, but I doubt that he has read much of Davies’s work. In the very article that Richard cites, Davies notes that physicists are suspicious of those who use multiverse theories to account for fine-tuning (as Richard does): 

Invoking the multiverse together with the anthropic, or biophilic, principle in an attempt to explain fine-tuning is still regarded with great suspicion, or even hostility, among physicists, although it has some notable apologists. There is consensus that such explanations should not impede searches for more satisfying explanations of the nature of the observed physical laws and parameters.[xiii] 

Two additional quotations from Davies may be enlightening: 

Not everybody is happy with the many-universes theory. To postulate an infinity of unseen and unseeable universes just to explain the one we do see seems like a case of excess baggage carried to the extreme. It is simpler to postulate one unseen God.[xiv] 

By allowing nature to realize all possibilities, anything at all might be “explained”. Indeed, we might need no science at all. It is merely necessary to make a case that such-and-such a feature is indispensable to human existence and, hey presto, it is explained. . . . It is hard to see how such a purely theoretical construct can ever be used as an explanation, in the scientific sense, of a feature of nature. Of course, one might find it easier to believe in an infinite array of universes than in an infinite Deity, but such a belief must rest on faith rather than observation.[xv] 

To be sure, Davies believes that our universe may indeed be part of a multiverse (and I’m open to the idea myself). Yet to employ a multiverse model as an explanation for some of our most spectacular scientific data stretches the bounds of credulity far more than it stretches the bounds of the universe.  

Hence, Richard’s explanation for the order and fine-tuning of the cosmos is that there was so much chaos that our orderly universe was an “inevitable” outcome. Similarly, we have seen that his response to the question “Why does the universe exist?” is simply “Because it just does.” But Richard isn’t done. He also has an “explanation” for the origin of life: 

[E]very possible planet that could be (given the universe and its physical laws) probably has been, is, or will be. Thus, that one or more planets should have all the right properties for biogenesis is probably a forgone conclusion, and our planet is known to be one of those rare few. . . . [S]cientific research upholds all the elements of [biogenesis]—the vast size and variation of the cosmos, the law of big numbers, the suitability of Earth for natural biochemistry, the ease with which a biochemistry can arise in such conditions, and the abundance throughout space, and especially our solar system, of all the chemicals needed to get life started. Everything from amino acids to sugar, from water to sulphur, from oxygen to nitrogen and carbon dioxide, has been found in space, sometimes in great quantities. And these are the things of which life is made. . . . Furthermore, experiments have proved that amino acids naturally chain into proteins, the building blocks of life, when subjected not only to many possible kinds of natural forces, but forces we know were common on the early earth, and beyond. Finally, scientists have manufactured proteins that naturally reproduce themselves without the aid of any additional enzymes, proteins so simple that we now know the odds of such things forming by chance are well within the realm of cosmic possibility. . . . Once reproducing chains of amino acids exist, mutation inevitably takes hold. . . . So, in fact, not only is random mutation in reproduction inevitable for the first life, such life would experience a very rapid rate of mutation.[xvi] 

Richard must be a poor poker player, because he isn’t very good at bluffing. He wisely avoids documenting his claims[xvii], and his statements are so vague that few of his readers will be able to investigate what he says. But perhaps this was the idea. If Richard had handed us some concrete claims, complete with references, we would have been able to dismantle his defense piece by piece. He obviously feels safer within the walls of the impenetrable fortress called “Vagueness” (the capitol building of Carrier Country). It is also important to note that Richard’s entire case for a natural origin of life is around a page and a half, which is strange considering this is a hotly debated topic and one that is essential for his defense. He may argue that his space was limited, but his book is more than 400 pages long and is filled with irrelevant digressions and numerous redundancies. Surely he could have omitted his political speculations in order to make room for some actual evidence. 

Nevertheless, Richard’s fuzzy and unsubstantiated discussion says enough to allow a short critique. Typical of atheist apologists, he argues that there are many important molecules in our universe, and that life is ultimately composed of such molecules. The conclusion is that, since we’ve got some of the materials for life, the development of life should be no surprise. Compare the following: 

Question: Where did you say the pyramids came from? I didn’t understand your point about chaos.

Answer: Well, just look around you! There are rocks everywhere, aren’t there? Indeed, there are rocks spread all over the universe. And these are the things of which pyramids are made. 

That may be true, but it doesn’t explain how these rocks became part of the ordered systems that we now observe. Richard therefore tries to buttress his claim with a few dubious reports. He says that “amino acids naturally chain into proteins” when subjected to forces that were common on the early earth. There are so many problems with this claim that it’s hardly worth responding to. First, when molecules join to form amino acids in nature (usually in extraordinary circumstances), they form equal proportions of left-handed and right-handed amino acids.[xviii] Yet the proteins in living cells are made up of left-handed amino acids only. Hence, Richard must explain how a pool of exclusively left-handed amino acids formed by chance, and he doesn’t do this. Second, amino acids react with a number of other molecules more readily than they react with one another, so Richard must explain how his pool of left-handed amino acids arose free from contamination by other molecules. Again, he doesn’t do this. Third, even if there were such a pool of uncontaminated, left-handed amino acids, the rate of amino acid polymerization (amino acids joining together to form chains) in water is extremely low. Peptides (chains of amino acids) tend to break down in water, and each increase in the desired number of amino acids decreases the probability of formation dramatically. Additionally, life requires specific polymers, not the random byproducts of chance. If Richard wants his more skeptical readers (i.e. readers that aren’t biased in favor of his view) to believe that proteins—the right proteins—were forming in any significant quantities, he needs to provide evidence, which he doesn’t do. Fourth, even if a number of proteins formed, against incredible odds, this isn’t life. The most basic functional living cell imaginable would require far more than just a couple of random proteins. And Richard still has to account for molecules like DNA, which is composed of nucleotides, not amino acids. Further, Richard would have to explain how all the necessary biomolecules, arising by chance, ended up in the same place and then joined together, in just the right order, to form life. Richard dismisses all of this as insignificant, yet this is one of the most crucial topics if his theory is to stand. One can only interpret Richard’s failure to support his view as the silence that comes from a complete lack of evidence. 

Richard’s next claim is that “scientists have manufactured proteins that naturally reproduce themselves without the aid of any additional enzymes.” Again, since he doesn’t give references, it is difficult to examine his statements (though he advises his readers to “always ask for the primary sources of a claim you find incredible”[xix]). I'm familiar with an experiment by David Lee’s team, in which it was found that a peptide taken from yeast had the ability to catalyze its own synthesis.[xx]  I also know of a molecule called “amino adenosine triacid ester,” which acts as a template to reproduce itself.[xxi] But such experiments are usually forced and rarely reflect anything that would happen naturally. However, even if we assume that a number of self-replicating proteins formed in the primal seas, this still doesn’t give Richard anything remotely resembling life. In addition to several hundred functionally correct proteins, he still needs many other macromolecules to perform numerous coordinated functions in the cell. 

As for Richard’s claim that once “reproducing chains of amino acids exist, mutation inevitably takes hold,” I challenge him to provide evidence that such mutations will result in an increase in complexity, or that these mutations would ever give rise to life. Richard’s well of evidence has obviously run dry, and it’s frightening to think that someone could have so much faith in a view that is so overwhelmingly improbable. 

Nevertheless, let’s grant Richard the existence of a living cell. What’s he going to do with it? Would such a cell, by random mutation and natural selection, ever produce the variety and complexity of life that we see all around us? Further, would we expect such a cell to eventually give rise to consciousness, the epitome of complexity? Though this topic is also critical for Richard’s case, he again fails to offer any evidence as to how consciousness arose. His section on “The Evolution of Mind” is just a page in length, and it merely describes his view of what a mind is, rather than providing a reasonable evolutionary pathway for the development of consciousness. 

Richard’s book is meant to be a defense of Metaphysical Naturalism. I have argued that his view must explain, minimally, (1) the existence of the universe, (2) the apparent fine-tuning of the universe, (3) the origin of life, and (4) the rise of consciousness. As we have seen, he defends (1) by arguing (inconsistently, I think) that the multiverse is eternal, that the first event (of something eternal?) consisted of a primal chaos, and that this first event didn’t need a cause because our belief in cause-effect relationships is only based on personal experience. Richard defends (2) by claiming that our highly ordered and fine-tuned universe was the “inevitable” outcome of chaotic forces. He accounts for (3) by saying, in effect, “We have all the parts of the machine, so it’s obvious that those parts could all come together in the right order without any problem whatsoever.” He doesn’t account for (4) at all, other than saying that it really did happen, and that it conferred an advantage on organisms that possessed it. 

In yet another example of Richard’s inconsistency, he tells his readers that we shouldn’t believe something until it’s been proven, and that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence: 

When there is no trustworthy evidence of something and no valid reason for it, you should not believe it.[xxii] 

[W]e have confidence only when the evidence is and remains overwhelming.[xxiii] 

Likewise, when scientists make extraordinary claims, they are expected to fork over evidence well beyond ordinary demands—evidence of extraordinary weight. When they fail to do so, they are not believed.[xxiv] 

Well, he hasn’t proven his view. Perhaps he thinks that, since he has written more than 400 pages, everyone will think that he has defended his worldview. But the facts remain. Richard can argue that there are multitudinous unobservable universes out there, but we don’t observe an endless series of universes extending back into eternity past. Instead, we observe a single universe that had a beginning; and based on all our scientific knowledge, whatever has a beginning must have a cause. Richard may claim that the immense degree of fine-tuning in our universe was inevitable, but we have no reason to think that such a pattern of forces and constants couldn’t be avoided. We don’t observe such finely-tuned systems arising out of chaos. These constants could have been different. In all probability, they should have been different. The fact that they are as they are implies that they were finely-tuned for a purpose—life. Richard may also expect his readers to believe that random collisions of molecules can produce coded information, but this isn’t what we see in nature. Information always comes from intelligence, and we have no reason to think that it was any different in the beginning. Richard can even tell us that consciousness arose as the natural byproduct of mutation and natural selection, but again, we don’t see this sort of complexity arising on its own. In effect, Richard has failed to defend a single important component of his theory. Theism, on the other hand, accounts for all of this quite comfortably. God created the heavens and the earth, and he made a fine-tuned world, which was necessary for his greatest creation—fully conscious, living beings.  

In a section titled “The Argument to the Best Explanation,” Richard correctly notes that the “best explanation will . . . rely on fewer undemonstrated assumptions than any competitors.”[xxv] Yet it would be difficult to imagine an explanation that has more undemonstrated assumptions than his. Richard is free to exercise his extraordinary faith in believing these assumptions, but to repeatedly declare that his position is founded solely on science and logic is an insult to science and logic. The unskeptical skeptic strikes again!

Go to chapter 5